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Although there have been several studies of the effect of
social security on private saving, there has been no attempt to
measure the welfare cost of this distortion. The present paper
develops an analytic framework for this evaluation and presents
numerical calculations.
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In recent years a substantial number of econometric studies have exa-
mined the effect of social security retirement pensions on the level of
private saving.1 Implicit in these studies is the presumption that reduced
saving implies a welfare cost. It is surprising therefore that there have been
no explicit attempts to evaluate the size of this welfare cost in a manner analo-
gous to the measurement of the welfare cost of distortionary taxes (e.g.,
Harberger 19614 and the studies cited in Atkinson and Stiglitz, 1980). The pur-
pose of the present study is to provide such an evaluation.
The analysis here shows that in an important special case a social
security program can reduce private saving without imposing any welfare loss.
In more realistic cases, however, the welfare loss is large both absolutely and
in relation to the size of the social security program.
The primary rationale for universal social security pensions is of
course to provide retirement income to those who lack the foresight to provide
for themselves. An evaluation of the net effect of social security therefore
requires balancing the welfare gain from this type of transfer payment against
the welfare loss caused by the savings distortion. A more complete analysis
would also include the distortion in retirement behavior and in pre—retireinent
labor supply caused by social security taxes and benefits. An evaluation of
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Barro (1979), Barro and MacDonald (1979), Blinder, Gordon and Wise
(1980), Darby (1979), Diamond and Hausman(1982),Feldstein (l971, 1977, 1980,
1982), Feldstein and Pellechio (1979), Kotlikoff (1979), and M.innell (1976).the welfare loss of the induced reduction in savings is however a useful
starting place and a natural sequel to the econometric studies of the effect of
socialsecurity on saving.
The present paper therefore makes the extreme assumption that labor
supply and retirement behavior are exogenously fixed and that each dollar of
"socialsecurity wealth't (i.e., the present value of social security benefits)
reduces private saving by one dollar. The latter assumption implies that social
security does not raise consumption during retirement. I want to emphasize that
this extreme assumption is not meant to represent reality1 but to focus the ana-
lysis on the welfare cost of reduced capital accumulation.
The reduction in private saving could, of course, be offset or more
than offset by accumulating a large trust fund with which to pay future social
security benefits (Samuelson, 1975; Feldstein 1977). In practice, however, the
social security program in the United States and in most other industrial
countries is unfunded. I shall therefore assume that there is no funding and no
changein other public capital accumulation to offset the reduction in private
capitalaccumulation.
The first section of this paper develops the analytic framework for
evaluating the net loss of reduced private saving. The second section presents
some illustrative numerical calculations. Then in the third section I examine
the effect of a finite horizon on the value of the welfare loss. There is a
brief concluding section that indicates the direction for future research on
this subject.
1Empirical estimates of the extent to which social security benefits reduce
private saving vary but most of the estimates indicate that each dollar of
social security wealth reduces private wealth accumulation by between 50 cents
and one dollar.—.,—
1.The Analytic Framework
In a very important paper, Paul Samuelson (1958) extended the life
cycle theory by developing an explicit overlapping generations model and used
this framework to analyze the effect of social security. Since Samuelson
assumed an economy without a productive capital stock or other durable store of
value, social security could play the welfare—increasing role of permitting
individuals to finance retirement consumption.
The absence of a capital stock is of course critical to Samuelson's
conclusion that an unfunded social security program increases the welfare of all
generations. In a model with a productive capital stock, the substitution of
unfunded social security for private saving raises the welfare of all genera-
tions only if the economy is initially producing with an inefficiently large
capital stock.1 When this is not true, the excess of the productivity of real
capital over the implicit rate of return earned on the taxes paid to an unfunded
social security program causes a loss to each generation of workers who par-
ticipate in the program. Since members of the initial generation of retirees
receive benefits without paying any taxes, their welfare is unambiguously
increased. The net welfare effect depends on balancing the gain to the first
generation of retirees against the loss to all future generations.
The framework for the present analysis will be an extended version of
Samuelson's overlapping generations model. Each individual lives for two
periods, working in the first period and retiring in thesecondperiod. All
1Cassand Yaari (1967) show that if the economy's rate of growth exceeds its
marginal product of capital, the substitution of' social security for private
saving raises welfare in all generations. This is an application of the fami-
liar proposition that welfare can be unambiguously improved by reducing capital
intensity in an economy whose capital intensity is greater than the golden rule
level. Samuelson's economy without productive capital is a special case of the
growth rate exceeding the productivity of capital.--
individualsare alike and earn a wage wt if ttiey work in period t. The labor
force grows at rate n per period and the real wage rate grows at rate g per
period. The basic difference from the Saimielson model is that savings may be
invested in real capital. Th avoid the complexities of an endogenous and time—
varying rate of return, I shall assume that the marginal product of capital
remains constant at rate p per period.
The number of aged retirees in each period (At) is equal to the number
of workers in the previous period (Lti). Since the population grows at rate n
per period, Lt =(l+n)Lt_iand Lt =(l+n)Ai.
Consider a social security program that imposes a tax at rate 0 on
wage income in each period. The workers in period t pay a tax of
Tt =0t1-and, because of the unfundedpay—as—you--go nature of the program,
receivebenefitswhen they retire equal to the taxes paid by the next
generation: Bt+1 =bt+1A.t+i
=Owt+1Lt+iwherebt is the benefit per retiree in
periodt.
The implicit rate of return, 1, that individuals earn on their tax
"contributions" is defined by the ratio of the benefits that they receive to the
taxes that they previously paid: Rt+1/Tt =Owt+iLt+i/tLt=(l+g)(l+n)=1+1
sincel+n = andl+g =wt+l/wt.The implicit rate of return is therefore
equal to the rate of growth of real income.
If the workers of generation t had instead saved and invested Tt,
their savings would have earned the real marginal product of capital, p. If
there were no tax on capital income, the individual savers would also receive a
return of p. it even if a capital income tax reduces the net return to indivi-
dual savers, the nation as a whole earns the entire pretax rate of return. I—)—
shallassume that the benefits of that tax revenue accrues to the generation of
savers who own the capital.1 Thus instead of receiving Bt+l =(1+Y)Ttin return
for their social security taxes, they would receive (1+p)Tt. The social security
program therefore reduces the retirement income of the workers of period t by
(P—y)Tt =(P_I)OwtLt.
The present value of this loss as of the first period of these worker's
lives is (p.-y) OwtLt/(1+d) where d is the rate at which individuals discount
income between the two periods. If there is no capital income tax, individuals
equate their rate of time preference to the marginal product of capital: d =P.
A capital income tax at rate t lowers the annual marginal rate of return to
individual savers2 from r to (1—t)r and therefore makes the net rate of return
per period N =Li+(i—t)r]Y—iwhere y is the number of years in a generation.
I shall define an effective "period tax rate" Tbythe identity N =(1—T)p.
Thus, with a capital income tax, the equality of the individuals' time preference
and the net rate of return implies d =(l—T)p.
In the next generation the corresponding loss is
(p_y)ew+1L+1/(l+d) =(p_I)e(l+g)w(l+n)L/(1+d) =(1+Y)(p-Y)OwtLt/(l+d).
Thus the generational loss grows at rate I.If the program is introduced with
workers of generation t0 and continues forever,3 the present value of the
infinite stream of' losses is given by
-
t=o(l+d)(l+6)
1This may bein the form ofdirect benefits for retirees, a lower tax rate on
capital income, or an equivalent reduction in the labor income tax. If instead
the revenue is used to reduce the tax burden on the next generation of workers,
the analysis would differ only slightly from the one that follows in the text.
2 . . Acapital income tax reduces the marginal return to individual savers even
thoughthe total return to savers as a whole is p.
3Thepossibility of a finite termination date is discussed in section 3.-6-
where 6 is the appropriate discount rate for the intergenerational aggregation
of consumption.1 Since wtLt =(l+g)tw0(1+n)t L0 =(1+y)tw0L0,
r
-(p_y)Ow0L0 1+1 z —l+d
tOLJ
Ifthe discount rate exceeds the growth rate (6> y), the sumconvergesand the
present value of the losses to all generations of workers is:
r1+6 Ow L Z
11+d 00
L
AlthoughZ measures the loss to all generations of workers who par-
ticipate in the program, it ignores the benefit to the initial generation of
retirees who receive benefits without paying any tax. Their benefits are equal
to the taxes paid by the first generation of workers, Ow-0L0. The present value




Thevalue of N depends critically on the value of 6, the social
discount rate used for the intergenerational aggregation of consumption. There
are two alternative theories of the appropriate definition of 6. The first
theory equates the social intergenerational discount rate with the private
intrageneration discount rate, i.e., 6 =d.The rationale for this approach is
shall return directly to the appropriate value of 5.that the generations are linked by bequests and that the preferences of the
bequethers are accepted as normatively valid. The alternative theory rejects the
private discount rate as irrelevant for intergenerational comparisons and bases
the social discount rate on the presumed decline in the marginal utility of
income as the level of income grows. If per capita income grows at rate g and
the elasticity of the individual marginal utility function is C, the marginal
rate of substitution of income in successive periods is (l+g) .Conventional
assumptions put C between 1 and 3l
Consider first the implication of equating the social discount rate
and the private discount rate, 6=d. In an econoir with no capital income tax,
the private discount rate should equal the marginal product of capital; thus d=p
and therefore &p. Substituting these values into equationimplies N=O. Thus
there is no net excess burden caused by the reduction in private saving if the
econoxxr has no capital income tax (or other savings distortion) and if the
marginal product of capital is used to discount future income reductions.2 In
this unique case, the benefit to the initial generations of retirees who receive
the unrequited transfer when the program is established just balances the inf i—
nite stream of losses sustained by all future generations.
If we continue to accept the equality of the social discount rate and
the private discount rate but recognize the existence of a capital income tax,
the welfare neutrality of the savings reduction disappears. With &=d=(l—t)p,
'Irving Fisher (1892) and Ignar Frisch (1932) purported to estimate Cby
imposing certain separability assumptions and obtained c=2.
conclusion also rests on the assmpt ion that changes in the rate of












Itis clear that N is an increasing function of the tax rate, the marginal pro-
duct of capital and the economy's rate of growth. A positive capital income tax
rate implies that the marginal product of capital exceeds the rate of time pre-
ference and therefore that any change in the rate of saving has a first—order
welfare effect.2 The higher the marginal product of capital, the greater the
welfare loss from any reduction in saving. A higher rate of growth of the eco—
nomy means that the annual losses grow at a faster rate and therefore have a
greater present value.
The net value presented in equation 14 can also be interpreted as the
net gain of terminating an existing program in year. Terminating the
program implies that the retirees in the terminal period receive no benefits
while the workers in that period and all future periods pay no tax and receive
no benefits. If the terminating period is defined to be tO, the net present
value (as of t=o) of the welfare gain of termination is measured by N with Ow0L0
the amount of tax that would be collected in that period if the program were not
terminated.
1Recall that Tisdefined so that (l—T)p is the after—tax rate of return per
period.
is analogous to the fact that any tax change has a first—order welfare
effect if there is a pre—existing distortionary tax._ —
Althoughthe absolute present valuemeasure is directly relevant for
assessing the desirability of startingor terminating a social securityprogram,
it is also interesting torestate this loss as a proportionof the present value
of all taxes.' Since taxes at t=Oare Ow0L0 and benefits grow at rateI per
period, the present value of taxes,discounting at rate 6, is
L o) —
6-.yo0
Theratio of the net loss to thispresent value of taxes is therefore
(7) N=('+6)(y)—(l+d)(&.y)
v (1+d)(i+6)(&.y)
Inthe important special case wherethe private and social discountrates are
equal (6=d), this implies
(8) =-
V 1+6
It is interesting tocompare this to the netloss
per dollar of his tax payments. Since hereceives a return
security taxes rather than the totalreturn of p,2 his loss
is a reduction in his retirementincome. Its present value
he 'works and paystaxis therfore (P—y)/(i+p).Since y>6
1Note that sincetaxes and benefits are equal ineach period, the present value of taxes is also thepresent value of benefits.
2flecafl thatindividuals y only receive thenet—of—tax return (l—T)p directlybutalsoget the benefit of the taxrevenue tp indirectly.
to a typical worker
of I on his social
is p.-y. This loss
asof the time that
isa necessary—10-
condition for the convergence of N and V, it is clear that N/v is smaller than
the steady state loss per dollar of tax revenue. This difference reflects the
fact that N/V incorporates the extra benefit to the initial generation of
retirees.
When the social and private discount rates are equal to the net—of—tax
rate of return, (l—T)p, equation 7 can be written
N=
v l+(l—T)p
The net loss per present value dollar of social security taxes is equal to the
tax revenue that is lost per dollar of foregone savings, discounted at the
individual's net of tax return.
2. Some Illustrative Calculations
Some numerical calculations will indicate plausible iragnitudes for the
welfare losses derived in the previous section. To obtain values for y, p and
T,Iwill use the experience of the U.S. economy in the three decades beginning
in 1950. I will assume that the length of a "period" or generation is 30 years.
During the thirty years beginning in 1950, the average annual rate of
growth of real personal income was 0.037, implying that y =(1.037)30—i=
1.97.The average pretax marginal product of capital in the U.S. nonfinancial
corporate sector was 0.ll1 (Feldstein, Poterba and Dicks—Mireaux, 1981),
implying that p =(i.iiI4)°—1=21.5O.Finally, during the same period these
corporations, their shareholders and their creditors paid approxin.te1y68 per-
cent of their pretax capital income in taxes to federal, state and local govern-
ments (Feldstein, Poterba and Dicks—Mireaux, 1981). Since this average tax rate—11—
mayexceedthe corresponding marginal tax rate, I will make theconservative
assumption that t=0.50. With r=0.l14 and t=0.50, (1—t)p =11÷(1_t)r]3O—1=.28.
Since p =2.50,I= 0.825.
Substituting these values into equation 5 (based on theassumption
that the social and private discount ratesare equal to each other and to the
net—of—tax return, (1—t)p) implies that the net loss isN=8.75 Oi0L0. The net
welfare loss caused by the reduction in saving inducedby the social security
program is equal to 8.75 times the initial size of theprogram, i.e., 8.75 times
the unrequited benefits received by the firstgeneration of retirees.
Alternatively, this calculation implies that reducing theexisting social
security program by a fraction f, and thereby denying benefitsof fOWTLT to the
"current" generation of retirees, wouldgeneratea net welfare gain of 8.75 0T1-r•
Theselosses and potential gains can be restatedas a proportion of
the present value of social security taxesby using equation 9. With Ip =20.21
and (l—i)p =14.28,equation 9 implies N/V =3.83;the net loss is 3.83 times
the present value of the taxes. Thissurprisingly high ratio reflects the fact
that the real pretax rate of return on theforegone investment is high relative
to the discount rate and that this differencecompounds substantially over the
30 year length of each period.1
Although these calculations are only illustrative, theparameter
assumptions are not unrealistic and the derived values of N andN/V do indicate
the substantial size of the potential welfare losscaused by the reduced savings
thatresultfrom starting or continuing an unfunded socialsecurity pension
program.
1Reducing the length of theperiod to 20 years lowers N and N/V but their
values remain high: N =5.86Ow-0L0andN/V =1.86.—12—
If we reject the assumption that the social discount rate is
necessarily equal to the private discount rate and instead use the assumed dimi-
nishing marginal utility of consumption to calculate 6, we obtain 6 =(1+g)
c—
whereg is the rate of growth of per capita real income and Cisthe elasticity
of the marginal utility schedule. During the three decades after 1950, the
annual rate of growth of real per capita income was0.023.Thus l+g =
(1.023)30=1.98.It is clear from equation 2 that convergence to a finite
value of N requires 6 >y=1.97and therefore C> 1.6.
With C= 2,6 =2.92.Equationimplies that with 6 =2.92and d =
(l—T)p=1.28,N =i6.6iOw0L0, substantially greater than the value of N
obtained by assuming that 6 =(1—t)p.Similarly N/V =I.21is larger than it
was with the higher discount rate. To reduce N to 8.75 O0L0, 6 must be equal
to (1—T)p =1.28.Since (1+ 6) =(1+g)
Ctheelasticity of the marginal utility
function must be at least 2.45.
Thus, both approaches to the selection of a discount rate indicate a
very substantial value for the net welfare loss.
3. Finite Horizons
The derivations and calculations in section 1 and 2 all assume that
the social security program goes on forever. There is never a "last generation"
that pays a social security tax but receives no benefit. In Samuelson's words,
social security is "a Ponzi game that works,"1 at least in the sense that it
continues to command political support even if each new generation incurs a
1Ponzi was a famous Boston swindler whose chain letter scheme collapsed when
further buyers cound not be found.—13—
welfareloss.'
It is important, however, to consider whether thequalitative results
and the general order of magnitude of the lossesdepends critically on the
assumption of an infinite horizon. As I noted earlier,terminating the program
in year T involves a net gain that isexactly equal in magnitude to the net
loss implied by starting a program in thatperiod, say
(' — Tp ¼l0) GT — TLT
(l—T)p-.y
in the special case in which d =6(l—T)p. The present value of this ter-.
mination gain (as of time t=o) must be offsetagainst the loss calculated for
the infinite horizon.
The present value of as of time zero is G (1_6)_TGT (l+(l_T)p)_TGT.
Thus:






Since y <(l—t)p,the offsetting gain is of decreasing relativeimportance as T
increases.
11f there versonly two generations, the workers would vote to terminatethe
program and, because they are more numerous, would prevail. Inreality, there
is a distribution of ages and some of those whoare not yet retired would be net
losers if the program were terminated. The redistributionin the actual program
further complicates the voting equilibrium. SeeFeldsteiri and Pellechio (l9T9b)
for a brief discussion of these issues andsome empirical estimates.—1 —
If,for example, the program is terminated after 3 generations (90
years), G =o.18N.The present value loss of a program that lasts three genera-
tions is thus 82 percent of the loss of an infinite program.
For plausible parameter values, the assumption of an infinite horizon
does not alter the qualitative or general quantitative conclusions.
14•Conclusion
The analysis and calculations presented in this paper make it clear
that a social security program that replaces an equal amount of private saving
can impose a welfare loss whose present value is many times the size of the
existing generation's benefit. The actual adverse welfare effect depends, of
course, on the extent to which social security benefits do depress private
saving as well as on the effect of social security programs on labor supply,
retirement behavior, etc. Moreover, because some individuals behave myopically,
the social security program not only reduces saving by less than the full amount
of taxes but also provides income to those who might otherwise have too little
in old age.
Evaluating the magnitude of the welfare loss caused by reduced saving
is therefore just one part of the evaluation of the welfare effect of social
security. A similar analysis is required to evaluate the effects of changes in
retirement and labor supply. These adverse consequences must then be balanced
against the favorable effect of providing retirement income for those who lacked
the foresight to provide for themselves. The net welfare effect of variations
from the current level of benefits could then be assessed as a basis for




Atkinson, A. and J. Stiglitz (1980) Lectures on Public Economics, New York:
McGraw—Hill
Barro, R.J. (1978) The Impact of Social Security on Private Saving,
Washington: American Enterprise Institute.
Barro R. and G. MacDonald, (1979) "Social Security and Consumer Spending in an
International Cross—Section," Journal of Public Economics.
Blinder, A., B. Gordon andD.Wise, "Life Cycle Savings and Bequests: Cross—
sectional Estimates of the Life Cycle Model," in The Determinants of
National Savings and Wealth, edited by Franco Modigliani, London and New
York: Macmillan, in press.
Cass, D. and M. Yaari, (1967) "Individual Savings, Aggregate Capital
Accumulation, and Efficient Growth," in K. Shell, (ed.) Essays on the
Theory of Optimal Economic Growth, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 233—268.
Darby, M.R. (1979) The Effects of Social Security on Income andtheCapital
Stock, Washington: American Enterprise Institute.
Diamond P.A. and J. Hausman(1982)"Individual Retirement and Savings Behavior
Decisions," presented at the Oxford Conference on Microdata and Public
Economics, June 27—30, 1982.
Feldstein M. (l9T1)"SocialSecurity, Induced Retirement, and Aggregate Capital
Accumulation," J.P.E. 82, 905—26.
____________(1977)"The Social Security Fund andNational Capital
Accumulation,"Funding Pensions: The Issues and Implications for
Financial Markets, a Federal Reserve Bank of Boston publication.
____________(1977)"Social Security and Private Savings: International
Evidence in an ExtendedLife Cycle Mzdel," in The Economics of Public
Services,M. Feldstein and R. Inman (eds.), London: Macmillan.
___________(1980)"International Differences in Social Security andSaving,"
Journal of Public Economics: 1, 225—.
____________(1982)"Social Securityand Private Saving: Reply" Journal of
Political Econonr: 90, 630_6142.
Feldstein, M. and A. Pellechio (1979a) "Social Security and Household Wealth
Accumulation: New Microeconomic Evidence" Review of Economics and
Statistics:61, 361—68.
Feldstein, M. and A. Pellechio (1979b) "Social Security Wealth: The Impact of
Alternative Inflation Adjustments" in C. Campbell, (ed.), Financing Social
Security.—16—
Feldstein, N., J.Poterbaand L. Dicks—Mireaux (1981) "The Effective
Tax Rate and the Pre—Tax Rate of Return," NEER Working Paper No. 7IO,
Journalof Public Economics, forthcoming.
Fisher, I.(1892), Mathematical Investigations in the Theory of Value and
Prices, Connecticut Academy of Arts and Sciences.
Frisch, R. (1932), "New Methods of Measuring Marginal Utility," in Beitrage
zur okonomischen Theorie (No. 3), Tubigen: J. C. B. Mohr.
HarbergerA.C. (1961) "Taxation, Resource Allocation, and Welfare" in J. Due
(ed.) The Role of Direct andIndirectTaxes in the Federal Revenue System,
Princeton Univertsity Press, Princeton, New Jersey.
Kotlikoff, L. J. (1979) "Testing the Theory of Social Security and Life Cycle
Accumulation," American Economic Review 69,396_11O.
Munnell,A. H. (l9T)TheEffect of Social Security on Personal Saving,
Cambridge, Mass. :Ballinger.
Sarrnielson, P. A. (1958) "AnExact Consumption—loan Model of Interestwith or
Withoutthe Social Contrivance of Money" Journal of Political Economy, 66,
167_182.
Samuelson,P. A. (1975) "OptimalSocial Security in a Life—cycle Growth
Model",International Economic Review, i6, 539_5)4I.